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Abstract:  
 
The article is devoted to investigate the problem of creation and improvement of country’s 
infrastructure based on public-private partnership (further referred as PPP). As an object of 
research, authors look at public relations, that arise during the implementation of projects 
under the framework of the PPP law. The article considers the norms of the PPP law, as well 
as other laws, that regulate various aspects of agreements under PPP.  
 
As a result of conducting research, authors conclude that first of all, the difference between 
PPP and other forms of collaboration between the state and private sector (e.g. rent, 
privatization) is in its private principles, legal mechanisms and forms of realization. Such 
relations require a well-developed normative-legal basis. Secondly, the main idea of the 
stated law is not the opportunity for the private party to purchase the object of the 
agreement, but a wide opportunity to develop an effective form of PPP. Given this, authors 
point out, that the law about PPP possesses a number of features, that need to be considered 
alongside with various branches of legal rights.  
 
After the law was accepted, there was a need to reconsider a number of normative-legal acts 
of federal and regional significance in the aspect of public investment and budgetary 
guarantees. Given this, it is necessary to investigate the problems of public-private relations 
regulation in a complex manner, which will allow to define the key directions for the 
development of this institution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The term “public-private partnership” has emerged in the beginning of 1990. A 
notable, historical example of PPP development can be the German experience, 
where the projects based on PPP were used in cooperative construction projects. The 
first non-commercial construction societies were created on the basis of private 
investment in the middle of XIX century. As a result of collaboration between non-
commercial companies with the public sector, the given companies were forced to 
impose certain regulations on their own business activity and profits distribution. 
The state in turn was granting these companies with tax shields and breaks.  
 
In the 19th century Russia practiced the interaction between public and private 
capital collaboration in the form of concessions. Further development of PPP wasn’t 
successful given the command economy of the USSR. 
 
The first stage of modern PPP is seen in the period 1995-2009. During this period, 
the Federal Law had been passed as of 30.12.1995 № 225-FL “About agreements in 
production”, which has established the following form of agreement; agreement 
according to which Russia passes the exclusive rights to search, investigate, extract 
mineral raw material in designated areas to an investor. Investor in turn is obliged to 
carry out operations at his own expense and risk. During such an agreement, the 
parties settle down on the conditions and order production distribution. In theory it is 
common to believe that this law has given a start to the legal mechanism of PPP. 
 
2. Theoretical, Empirical and Methodological Grounds of Research 
 
In Russia, research of concrete forms of PPP is a complicated process, as the 
following institution is relatively new for the Russian practices and there is no 
official register or data about PPP projects. 
 
According to the Infrastructure Projects Director of Gazprombank P. Brusser there 
are three main forms of PPP in Russia; concession, agreement about public-private 
partnership in compliance with the regional legislation and privatization (entry into 
the state companies share). The instruments used can vary being the investment 
loan, infrastructure bonds and shares, as well as any from of structured project, 
including those, that are currently not used in Russia, yet successfully applied in the 
West.  
 
Therefore, we can conclude, that while choosing the form of a project, the parties 
engaged in PPP need to analyse the project, as well as an optimal model for 
collaboration. PPP projects are not just a form of public-private partnership, as such 
an agreement implies a selection of individual rights and bonds configuration for the 
parties. State pursues publically significant interests, while the aim of the private 
partner is profit maximization. Given such opposing aims, the agreements made 
under PPP are mixed, and are not labelled in the Russia rights code. Therefore, it is 
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up to the parties in PPP to choose the optimal form for project realization, relying on 
the type of rights, conditions for construction and object transfer, cost of the 
contract, deadlines and relevant experience of both parties in relation to the project. 
 
Defining factor for development of various forms of PPP is the opportunity, 
provided by the PPP law, for the private party to obtain property rights for the object 
under the agreement. Morever, the property right in the context of the law and page 
209 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part 1) as of 30.11.1994 № 51-FL 
(later as CC RF) is different, as the ownership right under the PPP law is initially 
limited by the bonds of the private party. Furthermore, the provision of this 
particular right is a significant element of PPP.  
 
It should be pointed out, that the formation of the ownership right for the object of 
the agreement from the private side defines the main difference between the 
concessional agreement and the PPP, as during the concessional agreement the 
ownership right will always belong to the public side. Part 12, p. 12 of the PPP Law 
proves the limitation of ownership rights, according to which the ownership right 
should be limited and is registered together with the ownership right for the object in 
the agreement. An example of such limitation is described in Part 13, p.12 of the 
PPP Law – private partner has no right to independently take control of the object in 
the agreement before the agreement becomes invalid, except for a change in the 
private partner, where the limitation of right doesn’t terminate.  
 
Rights limitation is also evident in the prohibiting the private partner to pawn the 
object, despite using it as a collateral for the financing party, given the presence of 
the direct agreement (Part 6, page 7 of the PPP Law). The borders of the ownership 
rights are formed in the process of right transfer to the public partner over a period 
of time, defined in the agreement (Part 4, Article 12 of the PPP Law). Therefore, 
relying on the examples stated above, it is possible to determine, that the PPP Law 
enforces a limited ownership right for the private partner in relation to the object of 
the agreement.  
 
Given the registration of rights limitation (Part 12, Article 12 of the PPP Law), there 
are also limitations in transferring the object of the agreement to the third parties for 
them to utilize, as the group of these parties is seriously limited. We believe that the 
legislator has introduced a model of rights ownership, that doesn’t fully reflect the 
interests of the private partner, as the main feature that distinguishes the PPP Law 
from the concessional agreement was in fact in emergence of “fully-fledged” 
ownership right for the private partner, while such right is limited while the 
agreement is valid and is no different from the rights for the object of concession. 
 
The PPP Law doesn’t allow multiple parties on the side of the public partner, 
although Part 1, Article 20 states that “in the interest of the private-public 
partnership agreement, the municipal-private agreement allows for 2 or more of the 
public partners to carry out a collective tender”. However, Part 3 of the stated 
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Article states, that a separate PPP agreement is made with each winner of the 
collective tender. The following rule complicate both the process of agreement, and 
the process of changing the agreement conditions, which may result in problems of 
implementation.  
 
Therefore, in direct interpretation of the PPP law, there is an uncertainty regarding 
the expediency of holding a joint tender, as it can result in legal risks. On the other 
hand, the later conclusion of a separate agreement with each of the public partners 
questions the effectiveness of the tender, as the main aim is a joint implementation 
of the PPP agreement, and a joint implementation should be agreed to by all the 
parties. Given the specifics of relations between the parties and terms for 
participants of the PPP, we believe that there is a need to correct the PPP law, in the 
part that relates to the parties that can be allowed during the realization of the 
project. Reform of the PPP law is possible through normative definition of the 
criteria of allowing third parties to participate in the project on the side of the private 
partner.  
 
The specifics of the PPP projects are in its large-scale financing not only by the 
public side, but by the private capital as well. Our view is that the government, as a 
participant, who should be more interested in implementing the PPP projects, as they 
are viewed as instruments of country’s infrastructure development, should bear some 
sort of financial responsibility not only in project financing but also as a budget 
guarantor.  
 
As the PPP institution in Russia is not well spread and developed, there are certain 
lags in legal-normative regulation of PPP financial mechanisms. This is further 
supported by the fact that at the moment, public financial entities, are mainly 
oriented at budget administration, tax collection, financial control and etc. While we 
believe that budget legislation should reflect the modern needs of infrastructure 
projects, as investment policy is directly related to PPP. 
 
The PPP law foresees not only the right for the public partner to “extra” finance the 
PPP project, but also the opportunity of full financial and technical provision for the 
object. Part 5 of the Article 6 of the mentioned law states that project financing from 
the budget can only be carried out through the provision of subsidies in accordance 
with the budget law (Emelkina, 2016; Shekhovtsov and Shchemlev, 2017).  
 
Therefore, the PPP law limits the instruments for financing, state support for the PPP 
projects is provided solely through the provision of subsidies. It is also important to 
point out, that Article 19 of the PPP law, that sets out the criteria for the competitive 
selection of the private partner, doesn’t contain the criteria that evaluates the 
applications of participants to obtain the subsidy. These participants, given their 
independence in defining the order by public-legal formation, as well as budget 
investment given individual character, do not require the use of competitive 
procedures in order to select the receiving parties (Shatkovskava et al., 2017). 
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Negative consequences of the excessively investment oriented budget policy, can 
lead to worsening of factors stimulating economically effective behaviour, as well as 
increasing power abuse from the officials. Statement 3 of the Part 3, Article 6 of the 
PPP law establishes the right of the partner to “ensure” financing. The law doesn’t 
explain what is meant by the word “ensure”, however it is sensible to assume that 
the ensuring instrument can be one or more ways to provide for the liabilities stated 
in the Article 329 CC RF (forfeit, collateral, guarantee, independent guarantee, 
deposit, provisional payment or other ways stated in the law).  
 
From the abovementioned ways of liability guarantees, it is obvious that not all of 
them are applicable in the case of PPP project financing. However, if we consider 
other ways of guarantee stated in the law, then the application of state and municipal 
guarantees is possible, which can ensure the liabilities of the public partner. 
 
3. Results 
 
Implementation of the PPP project is relatively long-term, on the basis of which it is 
necessary to provide for the government guarantees for the whole term of 
agreement. Unequal time periods for the projects and guarantees is a legal problem, 
as the Budget Code of the Russian Federation (later BC RF) contains limitations in 
relation to the length of state guarantee duration (30 years), which at first glance is 
sufficient for the PPP project. However, the guarantees can only be satisfied in the 
case that annual budget law foresees the suitable budget item in relation to the terms 
of guarantee liabilities (Part 1 of Article 116, Part 1 of Article 117 BC RF). In other 
words the duration of the guarantee is formally defined by one year, i.e., by the 
budget law. 
 
The following case is the deficiency in budget financing, which doesn’t allow to 
establish certainty about the long-term financing of the PPP project, which in turn, 
can create long-term risks, for both private party and the investors. It is also 
important to point out another aspect, which opposes the realization of government 
guarantee issue to the private investors. In accordance to Part 5 of the Article 115 of 
BC RF, government guarantee should contain the information about presence or 
absence of the right of the guarantor to the principal regarding the refund, which 
have been paid to the beneficiary, given the state or municipal guarantee (regressive 
claim of the guarantor to the principal). According to Part 1 of the Article 115.2 BC 
RF, in case of the presence of a regressive claim, principal must provide the 
guarantor with provision, which complies with Part 3 of the Article 93.2 BC RF, 
according to which, the provision has to be of the following form “bank guarantees, 
bails, state and municipal guarantees, collateral of the sum that is no less than 
100% of the loan. Provision of liabilities should be highly liquid.” 
 
Obviously, such criteria do not fully reflect the commercial relations of the private 
party and the investors. If the principal (private partner) had the mentioned 
provision, then the need to obtain the state guarantee would be eliminated, as in 
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market price terms, the provision is very similar to the guarantee and the principal 
can directly ensure its own liabilities in front of the investors, for example on the 
security of liquid assets, without having to use the mechanism of state guarantees. 
While making the decision about guarantee provision, a deep financial analysis of 
the private partner is performed. The results of this analysis may never be disclosed, 
even in case of the guarantee being issued. 
 
Another important factor of budget financing of the PPP is the use of targeting 
programs, budget events aimed at co-financing of PPP projects from the side of the 
public partner. According to Article 179 BC RF, state programs are confirmed by 
the government entities of the same level as the one where PPP project is being 
implemented. The type of support should be established in the program; subsidy, or 
costs refunds (Article 78 BC RF), or budget investment (Part 5 of the Article 79 BC 
RF). At the moment, the provision of budget investment for the PPP projects is 
possible, but only for projects related to object of capital construction in compliance 
with concessional agreements. Therefore, we can also need for amendments in BC 
RF, as the procedures of budget investment provisions not compling with the PPP 
law requirements. 
 
Therefore, after the PPP has been passed, there has been an emerging need for 
reconsideration of a number of normative-legal acts of federal and regional 
significance in the aspects of public investment and guarantees provision. We 
believe that in the first place BC RF needs to be amended in the following aspects: 
 
1. Provision of long-term state and municipal guarantees; 
2. The opportunity to finance the PPP projects via accepting the target 
programs; 
3. Regulation of long-term budget spending in the form of financial liabilities 
of the public partner in the PPP projects.  
 
Apart from traditional sources of PPP financing, it is necessary to consider the new 
market mechanisms of financial sources. One of these sources of financing can be 
the “infrastructure bonds”, which do not have a normative consolidation in Russia, 
however are used for large scale projects realization. The use of “infrastructure 
bonds” in Russia was first mentioned in 2007-2008. The “Strategy for Railroad 
Transport Development of the Russian Federation until 2030” defines the aim to 
finance railroad transport, including the use of such instruments as infrastructure 
bonds. The program for infrastructure bonds development is also included in the 
“Strategy for Financial Market Development in the Russian Federation for the 
period until 2020”. 
 
The abovementioned strategy for financial market development is offered for “aims 
to attract investment resources into the long-term projects for transport, energy, 
property and social infrastructure development, implemented on the basis of PPP, to 
foresee measures targeted at stimulating the investment into infrastructure bonds. In 
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order to achieve these aims, there are required changes that need to happen to the 
Russian legislation, which will provide for rights protection of infrastructure bonds 
owners, as well as will provide the opportunity to invest the funds of credit 
organisations, pension savings accumulated by the Pension Fund of the Russian 
Federation, as well as private non-government pension funds into such bonds”. 
 
The mentioned directions for development are contained in the “Events plan from 
the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation regarding the 
implementation of actions aimed at improving the health of financial sector and 
other sectors of the economy” – “ provision for issuance of infrastructure bonds, 
including the guarantees from Russian Federation and Vnesheconombank, for 
infrastructure product financing, realized on the principals of public-private 
partnership”. 
 
Despite the collective interest of government and business-societies to make 
investing in infrastructure bonds common, at the moment this institute is not 
normatively regulated, which creates uncertainty regarding its capabilities in the 
framework of the PPP agreement. 
 
In order to achieve successful project implementation on the PPP basis, with 
investor interests being satisfied, the PPP law offers the private partner the right to 
transfer the rights regarding the PPP object on security terms. However, the actual 
PPP law doesn’t disclose the institution of this security, which means that there is a 
need for complex analysis of security rights relations in the Russia law, accounting 
for the tendency to reform civil legislation. The PPP law accounts for imperative 
foundation to justify security: 
  
1. The use of security to support the liability to the financing party;  
2. The presence of direct agreement between the project agreement and the financing  
     party. The PPP law doesn’t contain any other basis for transfer of the agreement    
     or private partner rights.  
 
Therefore, relying on the interpretation of these rules, we can conclude that the circle 
of subjects of collateral relations is defined in three ways by the PPP law: 
  
1. Depositor – private partner;  
2. Creditor – financing party;  
3. Public partner – status is not defined in the classic understanding of the term  
     “security”. 
 
The public partner is given a special role, as one should act as guarantor of the 
project realization and unsure that no rights are breached from the side of the private 
partner and the financing party, as their actions can result in intended penalty for the 
object of security. 
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However, under the current framework of depositing a PPP object there is a number 
of deficiencies; Part 6 of Article 7 sets the delay period before incurring a penalty 
regarding the deposit at 180 days since the emergence of the reason to chase the 
penalty. It also establishes a ban on the penalty in case of early dissolution of the 
PPP agreement, given serious agreement breaching from the private side. Given 
such relationship, property protection of the financing party from violations by the 
private party seems ineffective.  
 
According to the newly published Part 2 of the Article 336 CC RF, the object of the 
deposit can be in the form of property, which will be created or purchased by the 
depositor in the future. “Deposit is registered only after the main liability or 
purchase of the stated property by the depositor, in the exception of the case when 
the law or the agreement state otherwise”. 
 
However, the stated norms may complicate the realisation of depositor rights in case, 
when the object of the deposit is included in the property that need registration. Part 
1 of the Article 339.1 CC RF states that deposit is subject to government registration 
if, in accordance to the law, the deposit rights are subject to government registration 
(Article 8.1 CC RF). 
 
Therefore, the agreement of depositing non-existing property can result in burdening 
of the property which doesn’t require government registration. The problems of 
depositing were pointed out by Makovskiy: “two serious threats caused by universal 
deposit are observable. First of all, it allows the more dominant party to technically 
enslave the other. Secondly, depositing all of the property to “your trustworthy” 
creditor, it is possible to exclude any other creditors issuing a penalty regarding 
your property”. 
 
Furthermore, the deposit agreement proposed by the PPP law, which doesn’t define 
the status of the public party, imposes extra risks for the private party. Such risk is 
defined by Part 7 of the Article 7 of the PPP law, which states that “in case of 
penalty being imposed on the deposit, the public partner has the dominant right to 
purchase the object of the deposit at the price, equal to the debt of the private party, 
but no more than the price of the deposit itself”. 
 
It is obvious, that if the parties make a deposit agreement, where the property being 
deposited hasn’t been created and registered yet, then at the moment of penalty 
request, the price of the deposit can be lower than the amount of monetary input 
from the financing party. 
 
Therefore, in the case of unsuccessful project implementation, the public partner is 
protected by the law, as it has a dominant right to purchase the deposit at the price, 
higher than its actual price. At the same time, the private partner, while borrowing 
the funds to implement the project, is at risk to face responsibility before the 
financing party (Part 2, Article 334 CC RF). 
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An important update regarding the institute of creditors should be pointed out. 
According to the Article 335.1 CC RF it is possible to have a number of creditors in 
relation to the same property, or a number of solidary and share creditors in relation 
to the liability ensured by the deposit. 
 
According to the BIS data (The Bank of International Settlement), in 2007, in Russia 
alone, the number of syndicated credit deals exceeded 2 billion US dollars. For 
comparison, the volume of syndicated credits issued in 2005 globally was around 
3,5 trillion US dollars. Such a big difference doesn’t only illustrate undeveloped 
institutions for large investment project financing, but also shows that deals related 
to syndicated loans, were mainly concluded under the foreign legal framework, even 
if both parties were Russian. 
 
According to the International Court of Arbitration data in 2009, the majority of 
cases were based on the British law. Actuality of development of Russian rules for 
syndicated crediting is also supported by the Federal Law Project № 204679-7 
“Regarding the changes in separate legislative act in the Russian Federation 
(regarding syndicated credits)”, which has been introduced to Duma in 21.06.2017. 
The stated law proposal also focuses on the deposit legal relations. 
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Based on the abovementioned facts we can conclude that at the moment, the focus of 
legislature is centred around the creation of new instruments to finance large scale 
investment projects, including those based on PPP. After the law about syndicated 
crediting being passed (given the right to use the PPP objects as a deposit), Russian 
business communities have been given an opportunity to conclude investment deals 
with the use of syndicated credit under the Russian rules, which should increase the 
attractiveness of PPP projects. 
 
We believe that the actuality of reforming the Civil code in the sphere, if deposit 
relations cannot be overvalued as the changes are progressive and have potential for 
development, the deposit institute is not defined by the PPP law to have full 
capacity.  
 
Therefore, in order to ensure effective rules implementation regarding depositing the 
object of PPP, the Russian Civil Code sets out new rules with respect to the deposit. 
At the moment, it is too early to talk about the direction of such a development, as 
creditors will have extra guarantees for the funds invested. 
 
It is necessary to point out that the problems of implementing the agreements on the 
basis of the PP law are relevant, which is caused by the emergence of new forms of 
PPP agreements, and lack of research in the sphere. Effectiveness of the 
implementation of PPP mechanisms while creating large scale infrastructure 
products is defined by successful international practice, which proves that there is a 
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need to research and improve the legal potential of PPP in Russia. The new 
opportunities for private capital attraction offered by the PPP, allow to define the 
need between the public and the private side. The rights to purchase the object of 
agreement and use the PPP object as a deposit, illustrate the development of Russian 
law in the sphere of connecting the interests of government and private business. 
 
However, new legal mechanisms need to be developed. In the conditions of 
insufficient budget funds and decreasing interest for Russian economy from large 
scale investors, the government should take the responsibility to develop the 
legislation, in order to improve economic attractiveness, as well as PPP related 
activity. In order to achieve the targets of country’s innovative development it is not 
only necessary to improve the current normative-legal base, but also the creation of 
new legal mechanisms, which will be able to support the effective legal and 
financial state of the project.  
 
The key problem in achieving the stated target is the limited budget planning, which 
doesn’t allow for long term liabilities between the public and private partners neither 
in project financing, nor in government guarantees provision. As the process of 
normative regulation development goes, it is necessary to refer to the concept of PPP 
legislation development, as well as account for the needs of parties implementing 
large scale projects. A good example of market relations overtaking the current 
normative-legal base is the implemented instrument for project financing in the form 
of infrastructure bonds issueing – such factors highlight the deficiencies of the legal 
regulation of project financing.  
 
Given the fact that PPP are of public importance, their realisation should result in 
positive public effect. Wide conditions for agreement provided by the PPP law, 
allow the parties to carry out effective government policy simultaneously 
economically stimulating the private partner. 
 
Bearing the functions of the main regulator of PPP, the government should also 
apply indirect methods for project support, as well as indirect influence innovation 
project, which are largely defined by public interest. We believe that such indirect 
methods include collaborative engagement of parties in ecological programs, aimed 
at reducing the negative impact on the environment. The development of such form 
of partner relations will not only ensure public result, but will also allow the private 
partner to extract the benefits, to obtain extra guarantees which are not implied in 
independent project implementation.  
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